Editor's note: John Waelti's series on the American Atomic Veterans continues with today's column.
After some 60 million deaths, World War II was finally over - brought to an abrupt end by the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Plans for the dreaded invasion of Kyushu and Honshu that were anticipated to cause an additional million American and several million additional Japanese casualties could be shelved forever.
J. Robert Oppenheimer's leadership of the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos was key to winning the race with Nazi Germany for the most powerful weapon the world had ever known.
The Manhattan Project brought new prestige to science and scientists, and especially to nuclear physicists. With this came moral and ethical implications of developing more destructive nuclear weapons. Oppenheimer, at the peak of his prestige, became a spokesman for science - and also a cautionary voice on nuclear expansion.
A report by a Board of Consultants appointed by President Truman in 1946 recommended creation of an international Atomic Development Authority that would essentially control nuclear materials and production. This document, the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, heavily influenced by Oppenheimer, was presented to the United Nations. It was rejected by the Soviet Union, seen as an attempt for the U.S. to maintain its nuclear monopoly. With this rejection it became clear that the arms race was on.
In 1947 Congress created the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Oppenheimer was named chair of its General Advisory Committee. In this position, Oppenheimer became a spokesman for international arms control, and attempted to influence policy away from an arms race. Thus began his drift away from prevailing American political winds, and his eventual clash with men of power.
His one meeting with President Truman did not go well. Oppenheimer told Truman, "I have blood on my hands." Truman replied, "Don't worry, it will all come out in the wash." Truman later told his Secretary of State, "Don't you bring that fellow around again. After all, all he did is make the bomb. I'm the guy who fired it off." Characteristically, Truman accepted responsibility. But tension between science and politics was increasing.
Oppenheimer and other members of the General Advisory Committee were opposed to developing an even more powerful weapon, the hydrogen bomb. With the successful atomic test by the Soviet Union in 1949, Truman overruled the Committee and announced a crash program. The arms race was on; Oppenheimer found himself increasingly against the political winds.
Inevitably, differences developed within the scientific community, exemplified by the rift between Oppenheimer and another brilliant physicist and former Los Alamos colleague, Hungarian born Edward Teller. In contrast to Oppenheimer, Teller had long been obsessed with developing the hydrogen bomb.
Comparing Oppenheimer and Teller to other scientists, Hans Bethe, a colleague of both, observed, " They were both much more emotional men, Teller openly so, Oppie equally emotional, I think, but more skillful controlling it. And because they were more emotional, they were more vulnerable than the others in the group to the exterior world and the immense pressures that would bring upon them after the Hiroshima bomb, and as the political importance of being a nuclear physicist became evident."
Oppenheimer was uniquely suited to lead the effort at Los Alamos. He had both the charisma and scientific credibility to lead the world's most brilliant scientists, strong-minded people with big egos, laboring under tremendous pressure to produce the atomic bomb, while at the same time getting along with the capable but difficult Gen. Leslie Groves, who headed military aspects of the project.
Now that the war was over, the geo-political situation had changed. If Oppenheimer had differences with the Truman Administration, his problems with the Eisenhower Administration escalated exponentially. The political climate was changing to benefit Teller who, becoming more isolated from fellow scientists, befriended powerful senators and Air Force generals.
In 1953, President Eisenhower asked Lewis Strauss to chair the AEC. Strauss accepted, insisting that Oppenheimer had to go. But dismissal had to be done carefully - Oppenheimer had a following and was credible with the public.
Oppenheimer's growing list of enemies included the U.S. Air Force that would be the delivery mechanism of nuclear weapons in case of war. An article in Fortune Magazine compiled a list of "good scientists," those who favored further nuclear development, and "bad scientists," those like Oppenheimer who were opposed. Critics believed this list was provided by the Air Force.
His vehement enemies included senators - Karl Mundt, Pat McCarron, William Jenner, and, of course, the Red-hunting Joe McCarthy, who had already ended honorable careers with his desultory, amorphous list of Communists.
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover had a long file on Oppenheimer but would not lead the charge. Should the case backfire, he could be blamed for scientists leaving government defense work. But Hoover was anxious to cooperate with information gleaned by illegal wiretaps.
Eisenhower's Secretary of Defense was of the opinion, "The quicker we get Oppenheimer out of the country, the better off we will be."
By 1954, it was almost as if Oppenheimer's enemies were competing to bring him down. The key factor that determines one's value in big time power politics is political usefulness. Not only was his political usefulness over, but Oppenheimer was seen as a political liability by the Eisenhower Administration. They wanted not only to get rid of him, but also discredit him as a voice on public policy.
Turning him over to Joe McCarthy could make short work of Oppenheimer. But this might spin out of control and drive scientists out of defense work. To quote Eisenhower, who despised McCarthy, "We have got to handle all this so that all our scientists are not made out to be Reds. That goddam McCarthy is just likely to try such a thing."
The political dilemma: How to credibly discredit Oppenheimer, the scientist who had served his country so brilliantly.
Next week: The trashing of Oppenheimer.
- John Waelti of Monroe can be reached at jjwaelti1@tds.net.
After some 60 million deaths, World War II was finally over - brought to an abrupt end by the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Plans for the dreaded invasion of Kyushu and Honshu that were anticipated to cause an additional million American and several million additional Japanese casualties could be shelved forever.
J. Robert Oppenheimer's leadership of the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos was key to winning the race with Nazi Germany for the most powerful weapon the world had ever known.
The Manhattan Project brought new prestige to science and scientists, and especially to nuclear physicists. With this came moral and ethical implications of developing more destructive nuclear weapons. Oppenheimer, at the peak of his prestige, became a spokesman for science - and also a cautionary voice on nuclear expansion.
A report by a Board of Consultants appointed by President Truman in 1946 recommended creation of an international Atomic Development Authority that would essentially control nuclear materials and production. This document, the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, heavily influenced by Oppenheimer, was presented to the United Nations. It was rejected by the Soviet Union, seen as an attempt for the U.S. to maintain its nuclear monopoly. With this rejection it became clear that the arms race was on.
In 1947 Congress created the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Oppenheimer was named chair of its General Advisory Committee. In this position, Oppenheimer became a spokesman for international arms control, and attempted to influence policy away from an arms race. Thus began his drift away from prevailing American political winds, and his eventual clash with men of power.
His one meeting with President Truman did not go well. Oppenheimer told Truman, "I have blood on my hands." Truman replied, "Don't worry, it will all come out in the wash." Truman later told his Secretary of State, "Don't you bring that fellow around again. After all, all he did is make the bomb. I'm the guy who fired it off." Characteristically, Truman accepted responsibility. But tension between science and politics was increasing.
Oppenheimer and other members of the General Advisory Committee were opposed to developing an even more powerful weapon, the hydrogen bomb. With the successful atomic test by the Soviet Union in 1949, Truman overruled the Committee and announced a crash program. The arms race was on; Oppenheimer found himself increasingly against the political winds.
Inevitably, differences developed within the scientific community, exemplified by the rift between Oppenheimer and another brilliant physicist and former Los Alamos colleague, Hungarian born Edward Teller. In contrast to Oppenheimer, Teller had long been obsessed with developing the hydrogen bomb.
Comparing Oppenheimer and Teller to other scientists, Hans Bethe, a colleague of both, observed, " They were both much more emotional men, Teller openly so, Oppie equally emotional, I think, but more skillful controlling it. And because they were more emotional, they were more vulnerable than the others in the group to the exterior world and the immense pressures that would bring upon them after the Hiroshima bomb, and as the political importance of being a nuclear physicist became evident."
Oppenheimer was uniquely suited to lead the effort at Los Alamos. He had both the charisma and scientific credibility to lead the world's most brilliant scientists, strong-minded people with big egos, laboring under tremendous pressure to produce the atomic bomb, while at the same time getting along with the capable but difficult Gen. Leslie Groves, who headed military aspects of the project.
Now that the war was over, the geo-political situation had changed. If Oppenheimer had differences with the Truman Administration, his problems with the Eisenhower Administration escalated exponentially. The political climate was changing to benefit Teller who, becoming more isolated from fellow scientists, befriended powerful senators and Air Force generals.
In 1953, President Eisenhower asked Lewis Strauss to chair the AEC. Strauss accepted, insisting that Oppenheimer had to go. But dismissal had to be done carefully - Oppenheimer had a following and was credible with the public.
Oppenheimer's growing list of enemies included the U.S. Air Force that would be the delivery mechanism of nuclear weapons in case of war. An article in Fortune Magazine compiled a list of "good scientists," those who favored further nuclear development, and "bad scientists," those like Oppenheimer who were opposed. Critics believed this list was provided by the Air Force.
His vehement enemies included senators - Karl Mundt, Pat McCarron, William Jenner, and, of course, the Red-hunting Joe McCarthy, who had already ended honorable careers with his desultory, amorphous list of Communists.
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover had a long file on Oppenheimer but would not lead the charge. Should the case backfire, he could be blamed for scientists leaving government defense work. But Hoover was anxious to cooperate with information gleaned by illegal wiretaps.
Eisenhower's Secretary of Defense was of the opinion, "The quicker we get Oppenheimer out of the country, the better off we will be."
By 1954, it was almost as if Oppenheimer's enemies were competing to bring him down. The key factor that determines one's value in big time power politics is political usefulness. Not only was his political usefulness over, but Oppenheimer was seen as a political liability by the Eisenhower Administration. They wanted not only to get rid of him, but also discredit him as a voice on public policy.
Turning him over to Joe McCarthy could make short work of Oppenheimer. But this might spin out of control and drive scientists out of defense work. To quote Eisenhower, who despised McCarthy, "We have got to handle all this so that all our scientists are not made out to be Reds. That goddam McCarthy is just likely to try such a thing."
The political dilemma: How to credibly discredit Oppenheimer, the scientist who had served his country so brilliantly.
Next week: The trashing of Oppenheimer.
- John Waelti of Monroe can be reached at jjwaelti1@tds.net.
