This brilliant physicist had the rare combination of charisma, intellect, and administrative skills to command the respect of the world's best scientific minds at Los Alamos, and deliver the atomic bomb that would end the war.
Editor's note: John Waelti's series on the American Atomic Veterans continues with today's column.
They had all been on the same team, working together - the military brass, the politicians, the scientists led by J. Robert Oppen- heimer. They had prevailed. Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan lay in ruins.
Within a few short years Oppenheimer would be no longer on the team - reduced to defending his patriotism before a review board. How could this happen?
This brilliant physicist had the rare combination of charisma, intellect, and administrative skills to command the respect of the world's best scientific minds at Los Alamos, and deliver the atomic bomb that would end the war. He had served his country, but at war's end was physically, mentally, and emotionally exhausted.
Oppenheimer's colleague, David Lilienthal, noted that after the successful Trinity test, "He is really a tragic figure; with all of his great attractiveness and brilliance of mind, as I left him he looked so sad." In Oppenheimer's own words after the bomb on Nagasaki, "There was not much left in me at the moment."
Autumn 1945, his work completed, he left Los Alamos with most of the scientists - most but not all. Another brilliant physicist, Edward Teller, remained to work on the hydrogen bomb. Teller was furious. He believed that had Oppenheimer remained, the other scientists also would have.
Weapons that could destroy civilization with the push of a button raised serious moral, ethical, and public policy questions. These matters would cause a rift between the scientists and politicians, and among scientists themselves.
War changes most everything. Before the war, the great physicists and mathematicians were a collection of obscure, rather eccentric academics, pretty much unknown outside their own circle. Except for American-born Oppenheimer, they were refugees from Europe, mostly Jewish, who socialized and traveled together.
Like Teller, the great mathematician, John von Neumann, was a Hungarian refugee. But it affected him differently - he didn't seem to have the periodic dark moods that characterized Teller.
The war brought these men out of obscurity - brilliant, strong minded, egocentric; they were needed to produce advanced, sophisticated, and deadly weaponry. Teller had once admired Oppenheimer. The rift between them may have originated at Los Alamos. Oppenheimer named Hans Bethe to head the Theoretical Division with Peter Weisskopf as deputy. Believing the position should have been his, Teller reminded Weisskopf that he, Teller, was a superior scientist. Weisskopf agreed, but reminded Teller that he, Weisskopf, got along better with colleagues.
After the war, these nuclear physicists had become the super stars of science and the academic world. They were no longer a collection of obscure academicians, but a valued national resource and, quite literally, instruments of foreign policy. What they thought - and said publicly - mattered.
Yet their powers were limited. These brilliant scientists could design deadly weapons. But the politicians would control their use. Inevitably, there arose moral and ethical issues. Do scientists bear moral responsibility for these horrible, destructive weapons? Or, is it their task simply to advance the science, and remain aloof on how and when these weapons are used? And what about the Soviet Union? Could America cease nuclear development and testing as the Soviet Union pressed on?
Initially after the war, as a member of the Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Oppenheimer was reluctant to push ahead with development of the more powerful hydrogen bomb. He became a leading voice for international arms control. With the Soviets' first successful atomic explosion in 1949, Truman ordered development to proceed, and the arms race was on.
With the Eisenhower Administration in 1952, Oppenheimer's views were increasingly against the prevailing political winds. Walter Teller had long been obsessed with development of the hydrogen bomb. Teller's views were now more in line with the political winds and he found himself having access to power that Oppenheimer once had enjoyed.
Eisenhower's appointee to the AEC, hardliner Lewis Strauss, wanted the Truman holdovers out, especially Oppenheimer. His views had become far too dovish, and his list of enemies, including powerful senators and Air force generals, was growing. The administration not only wanted him out, but to discredit him as a voice for public policy.
In high level American power politics, rather than debate an opposing view on public policy, a frequent and effective technique is to discredit the proponent of that view. Unfortunately, there were enough skeletons in Oppenheimer's closet to make it easy for his powerful enemies to do just that. And there is always the matter of past personal slights, real or imagined.
During the war Oppenheimer, and Strauss who at the time had a Navy desk job, once rendered conflicting testimony before a congressional committee on the value of research isotopes. Strauss believed research isotopes extremely important. Oppenheimer testified that they were less important than electronic devices, but more important than "let us say, vitamins." The ensuing laughter in the hearing room embarrassed and angered Strauss. A few short years later, Strauss was chair of the AEC.
More devastating was Oppenheimer's past youthful dalliance with so-called Communist "fellow travelers" when he was a professor of physics at U.C. Berkeley. Like many intellectuals of that era - the Great Depression and the Spanish civil war - he had attended some meetings. The icing on the cake was that he had married a woman who was once a member of the Communist party.
This was now the 1950s, the McCarthy era and the Red scare. Never mind that Josef Stalin's barbaric excesses had long since purged the youthful Oppenheimer of any soft spot he might once have had for the Soviets. And never mind that the bomb developed by Oppenheimer and colleagues had ended the war and saved up to a million American casualties.
If his youthful dalliance with the wrong company were not enough to discredit Oppenheimer, there would be the devastating testimony of his fellow scientist, Edward Teller.
Next week: Oppenheimer, Teller, and nuclear testing.
- John Waelti of Monroe can be reached at jjwaelti1@tds.net.
They had all been on the same team, working together - the military brass, the politicians, the scientists led by J. Robert Oppen- heimer. They had prevailed. Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan lay in ruins.
Within a few short years Oppenheimer would be no longer on the team - reduced to defending his patriotism before a review board. How could this happen?
This brilliant physicist had the rare combination of charisma, intellect, and administrative skills to command the respect of the world's best scientific minds at Los Alamos, and deliver the atomic bomb that would end the war. He had served his country, but at war's end was physically, mentally, and emotionally exhausted.
Oppenheimer's colleague, David Lilienthal, noted that after the successful Trinity test, "He is really a tragic figure; with all of his great attractiveness and brilliance of mind, as I left him he looked so sad." In Oppenheimer's own words after the bomb on Nagasaki, "There was not much left in me at the moment."
Autumn 1945, his work completed, he left Los Alamos with most of the scientists - most but not all. Another brilliant physicist, Edward Teller, remained to work on the hydrogen bomb. Teller was furious. He believed that had Oppenheimer remained, the other scientists also would have.
Weapons that could destroy civilization with the push of a button raised serious moral, ethical, and public policy questions. These matters would cause a rift between the scientists and politicians, and among scientists themselves.
War changes most everything. Before the war, the great physicists and mathematicians were a collection of obscure, rather eccentric academics, pretty much unknown outside their own circle. Except for American-born Oppenheimer, they were refugees from Europe, mostly Jewish, who socialized and traveled together.
Like Teller, the great mathematician, John von Neumann, was a Hungarian refugee. But it affected him differently - he didn't seem to have the periodic dark moods that characterized Teller.
The war brought these men out of obscurity - brilliant, strong minded, egocentric; they were needed to produce advanced, sophisticated, and deadly weaponry. Teller had once admired Oppenheimer. The rift between them may have originated at Los Alamos. Oppenheimer named Hans Bethe to head the Theoretical Division with Peter Weisskopf as deputy. Believing the position should have been his, Teller reminded Weisskopf that he, Teller, was a superior scientist. Weisskopf agreed, but reminded Teller that he, Weisskopf, got along better with colleagues.
After the war, these nuclear physicists had become the super stars of science and the academic world. They were no longer a collection of obscure academicians, but a valued national resource and, quite literally, instruments of foreign policy. What they thought - and said publicly - mattered.
Yet their powers were limited. These brilliant scientists could design deadly weapons. But the politicians would control their use. Inevitably, there arose moral and ethical issues. Do scientists bear moral responsibility for these horrible, destructive weapons? Or, is it their task simply to advance the science, and remain aloof on how and when these weapons are used? And what about the Soviet Union? Could America cease nuclear development and testing as the Soviet Union pressed on?
Initially after the war, as a member of the Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Oppenheimer was reluctant to push ahead with development of the more powerful hydrogen bomb. He became a leading voice for international arms control. With the Soviets' first successful atomic explosion in 1949, Truman ordered development to proceed, and the arms race was on.
With the Eisenhower Administration in 1952, Oppenheimer's views were increasingly against the prevailing political winds. Walter Teller had long been obsessed with development of the hydrogen bomb. Teller's views were now more in line with the political winds and he found himself having access to power that Oppenheimer once had enjoyed.
Eisenhower's appointee to the AEC, hardliner Lewis Strauss, wanted the Truman holdovers out, especially Oppenheimer. His views had become far too dovish, and his list of enemies, including powerful senators and Air force generals, was growing. The administration not only wanted him out, but to discredit him as a voice for public policy.
In high level American power politics, rather than debate an opposing view on public policy, a frequent and effective technique is to discredit the proponent of that view. Unfortunately, there were enough skeletons in Oppenheimer's closet to make it easy for his powerful enemies to do just that. And there is always the matter of past personal slights, real or imagined.
During the war Oppenheimer, and Strauss who at the time had a Navy desk job, once rendered conflicting testimony before a congressional committee on the value of research isotopes. Strauss believed research isotopes extremely important. Oppenheimer testified that they were less important than electronic devices, but more important than "let us say, vitamins." The ensuing laughter in the hearing room embarrassed and angered Strauss. A few short years later, Strauss was chair of the AEC.
More devastating was Oppenheimer's past youthful dalliance with so-called Communist "fellow travelers" when he was a professor of physics at U.C. Berkeley. Like many intellectuals of that era - the Great Depression and the Spanish civil war - he had attended some meetings. The icing on the cake was that he had married a woman who was once a member of the Communist party.
This was now the 1950s, the McCarthy era and the Red scare. Never mind that Josef Stalin's barbaric excesses had long since purged the youthful Oppenheimer of any soft spot he might once have had for the Soviets. And never mind that the bomb developed by Oppenheimer and colleagues had ended the war and saved up to a million American casualties.
If his youthful dalliance with the wrong company were not enough to discredit Oppenheimer, there would be the devastating testimony of his fellow scientist, Edward Teller.
Next week: Oppenheimer, Teller, and nuclear testing.
- John Waelti of Monroe can be reached at jjwaelti1@tds.net.
