When nations feel threatened, they react, and not necessarily with wisdom.
When United Nations - mainly American - forces pushed north toward the Yalu River in 1950, China entered the Korean War in a major way.
Russia has a long history of being invaded from western European nations. As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) brought eastern European nations into the fold, we should not have been surprised that Russia reacted.
Would such a powerful nation as the United States react violently when an armed revolution takes over a small Caribbean island nation? It would and it did.
In 1959, revolutionary forces under the leadership of Fidel Castro overthrew the corrupt dictatorship of Fulgencia Batista. However corrupt, Batista was staunchly anti-communist. During the Cold War this was enough to make him our guy in Cuba.
In contrast, Fidel Castro's regime was fashioned after a socialist model, and the U.S. was wary of his relationship with Nikita Khrushchev and the Soviet Union.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the Eisenhower administration hatched a plan with the ultimate objective of overthrowing the Castro regime and establishing a non-communist government friendly to the United States. The CIA had previously engineered coups in Guatemala and Iran that were seen as "successful," although both, especially the Iranian coup, had disastrous long-run consequences.
The CIA set up training camps for counter-revolutionary forces in Guatemala. By November of 1960, a small army was trained for an assault on Cuba and guerilla warfare. The head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, a committee of Cuban exiles, was poised to take over the presidency of Cuba, assuming success of the operation.
The plan included a 1,400-man invasion force to launch a surprise attack at the Bay of Pigs. Airstrikes were to hit Cuban air bases and knock out or cripple the Cuban Air Force. Paratroopers dropped in advance of the invasion were intended to disrupt transportation and repel Cuban forces. A smaller force would land on the east coast of Cuba to create confusion.
The plan was supposedly a covert operation, designed to take Castro by surprise. It was ultimately the invasion force that suffered confusion and surprise.
The "secret" plan was discovered by Castro as early as October of 1960, well before the planned execution of the operation. Keeping secret large training camps in Central America would be a tall order.
And, how would a 1,400-man force fight a 200,000 man Cuban army? That easy. With the appearance of counter-revolutionary forces, anti-Castro warriors would come out of the hills and join the invaders. CIA Director Allen Dulles insisted that the exiles would "light the fuse" that would spark a general uprising on the island. We were to hear similar bromides again and again during future conflicts.
President Eisenhower had approved the CIA-hatched program in March 1960. Prior to his inauguration in January 1961, President-elect Kennedy was briefed on the plan.
JFK, new in his job, had inherited an awkward situation. He authorized the plan but determined to disguise U.S. support. He gave approval for the operation to begin on April 15, 1961.
Between loose talk by members of the invading brigade and Castro's intelligence network, Castro knew the invasion was imminent. In fact, the Washington Post later reported that the CIA knew that Castro knew, but failed to inform JFK of this crucial information.
The diversionary landing occurred the night of April 15 with U.S. Navy destroyers stationed off-shore to create the appearance of an impending invasion. Obsolete WWII B-26 bombers, painted over to look like Cuban Air Force planes, left Nicaragua to bomb Cuban airfields. They missed many of their targets, leaving the Cuban Air Force intact. It was downhill from there.
The main Cuban-exile invasion force on April 17 landed on beaches along the Bay of Pigs. They were immediately strafed by Cuban planes that also sank two escort ships, destroying half the exiles' support materiel. Bad weather forced them to work with soggy equipment and insufficient ammunition.
Of the paratroopers and heavy equipment that was dropped from air transports, much of the equipment was lost in the swamps.
On April 19, an "air umbrella" consisting of six unmarked American fighter planes were released to help defend the brigade's bombers. The bombers left an hour late, ostensibly confused by the time zone difference between Nicaragua and Cuba.
In short, just about everything that could have gone wrong did - and the entire fiasco was over in three days. And, surprise, surprise, the mass rebellion of Cubans never occurred. The British ambassador to the U.S. had earlier stated that British intelligence analysis made available to the CIA had indicated that Cuban people were predominantly behind Castro, and there was never any likelihood of mass defections or insurrections. Quite simply, they did not want the Batista regime back.
The failed invasion was a severe embarrassment to the Kennedy Administration. Early on, he was angry with the CIA and once declared that he wanted "to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds." That didn't happen, but from then on, he was wary of the CIA and generals.
The failed invasion solidified the Castro regime and his ties to the Soviet Union. This led to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, a dangerous episode, coming closer than most people realize, to all out nuclear war with the Soviet Union.
For many Latin Americans, the Bay of Pigs invasion reinforced the widely held belief that the U.S. could not be trusted. And it gave Castro the opportunity to tweak Uncle Sam's nose again and again.
The CIA's Keystone Cops operation was a total failure. But maybe they could still get rid of the bearded one.
Next week: Castro and the exploding cigar ruse.
- John Waelti's column appears every Friday in the Times. He can be reached at jjwaelti1@tds.net.
When United Nations - mainly American - forces pushed north toward the Yalu River in 1950, China entered the Korean War in a major way.
Russia has a long history of being invaded from western European nations. As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) brought eastern European nations into the fold, we should not have been surprised that Russia reacted.
Would such a powerful nation as the United States react violently when an armed revolution takes over a small Caribbean island nation? It would and it did.
In 1959, revolutionary forces under the leadership of Fidel Castro overthrew the corrupt dictatorship of Fulgencia Batista. However corrupt, Batista was staunchly anti-communist. During the Cold War this was enough to make him our guy in Cuba.
In contrast, Fidel Castro's regime was fashioned after a socialist model, and the U.S. was wary of his relationship with Nikita Khrushchev and the Soviet Union.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the Eisenhower administration hatched a plan with the ultimate objective of overthrowing the Castro regime and establishing a non-communist government friendly to the United States. The CIA had previously engineered coups in Guatemala and Iran that were seen as "successful," although both, especially the Iranian coup, had disastrous long-run consequences.
The CIA set up training camps for counter-revolutionary forces in Guatemala. By November of 1960, a small army was trained for an assault on Cuba and guerilla warfare. The head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, a committee of Cuban exiles, was poised to take over the presidency of Cuba, assuming success of the operation.
The plan included a 1,400-man invasion force to launch a surprise attack at the Bay of Pigs. Airstrikes were to hit Cuban air bases and knock out or cripple the Cuban Air Force. Paratroopers dropped in advance of the invasion were intended to disrupt transportation and repel Cuban forces. A smaller force would land on the east coast of Cuba to create confusion.
The plan was supposedly a covert operation, designed to take Castro by surprise. It was ultimately the invasion force that suffered confusion and surprise.
The "secret" plan was discovered by Castro as early as October of 1960, well before the planned execution of the operation. Keeping secret large training camps in Central America would be a tall order.
And, how would a 1,400-man force fight a 200,000 man Cuban army? That easy. With the appearance of counter-revolutionary forces, anti-Castro warriors would come out of the hills and join the invaders. CIA Director Allen Dulles insisted that the exiles would "light the fuse" that would spark a general uprising on the island. We were to hear similar bromides again and again during future conflicts.
President Eisenhower had approved the CIA-hatched program in March 1960. Prior to his inauguration in January 1961, President-elect Kennedy was briefed on the plan.
JFK, new in his job, had inherited an awkward situation. He authorized the plan but determined to disguise U.S. support. He gave approval for the operation to begin on April 15, 1961.
Between loose talk by members of the invading brigade and Castro's intelligence network, Castro knew the invasion was imminent. In fact, the Washington Post later reported that the CIA knew that Castro knew, but failed to inform JFK of this crucial information.
The diversionary landing occurred the night of April 15 with U.S. Navy destroyers stationed off-shore to create the appearance of an impending invasion. Obsolete WWII B-26 bombers, painted over to look like Cuban Air Force planes, left Nicaragua to bomb Cuban airfields. They missed many of their targets, leaving the Cuban Air Force intact. It was downhill from there.
The main Cuban-exile invasion force on April 17 landed on beaches along the Bay of Pigs. They were immediately strafed by Cuban planes that also sank two escort ships, destroying half the exiles' support materiel. Bad weather forced them to work with soggy equipment and insufficient ammunition.
Of the paratroopers and heavy equipment that was dropped from air transports, much of the equipment was lost in the swamps.
On April 19, an "air umbrella" consisting of six unmarked American fighter planes were released to help defend the brigade's bombers. The bombers left an hour late, ostensibly confused by the time zone difference between Nicaragua and Cuba.
In short, just about everything that could have gone wrong did - and the entire fiasco was over in three days. And, surprise, surprise, the mass rebellion of Cubans never occurred. The British ambassador to the U.S. had earlier stated that British intelligence analysis made available to the CIA had indicated that Cuban people were predominantly behind Castro, and there was never any likelihood of mass defections or insurrections. Quite simply, they did not want the Batista regime back.
The failed invasion was a severe embarrassment to the Kennedy Administration. Early on, he was angry with the CIA and once declared that he wanted "to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds." That didn't happen, but from then on, he was wary of the CIA and generals.
The failed invasion solidified the Castro regime and his ties to the Soviet Union. This led to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, a dangerous episode, coming closer than most people realize, to all out nuclear war with the Soviet Union.
For many Latin Americans, the Bay of Pigs invasion reinforced the widely held belief that the U.S. could not be trusted. And it gave Castro the opportunity to tweak Uncle Sam's nose again and again.
The CIA's Keystone Cops operation was a total failure. But maybe they could still get rid of the bearded one.
Next week: Castro and the exploding cigar ruse.
- John Waelti's column appears every Friday in the Times. He can be reached at jjwaelti1@tds.net.
