American foreign policy after WWII is characterized by myopia and disaster. Our policy toward Cuba is but one example. President Obama's recent proposal to normalize diplomatic relations with Cuba is seen as refreshing change, including among some of his usual detractors. Even the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has expressed support for this change. Last I heard, that worthy organization is still ardently Republican.
Among things that nations, whether communist, socialist, or capitalist, have in common is hostile reaction to threats, whether real or perceived. It was a threat to America, whether real or perceived, that led to the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion back in 1961.
A look back to a prior decade is instructive. Autumn 1950, the Korean War - based on their experience with amphibious landings, the Navy and Marine Corps, along with the Joint Chiefs, had opposed General MacArthur's plan for the amphibious landing at Inchon. The narrow harbor, the fluctuating tides with exposed mud flats - it was too risky.
MacArthur persisted, and convinced his critics. Against the advice of Soviet and Chinese advisors who had studied MacArthur and anticipated an amphibious landing, possibly at Inchon, Kim Il Sung had not mined the narrow harbor. The landing succeeded beyond even MacArthur's expectations, further enhancing his reputation. With the North Korean army in shambles, there was enormous political and military pressure for the United Nations forces to push north to the Yalu River, the border between Korea and Manchuria.
When President Truman questioned MacArthur about the possibility of China entering the war, he assured the president that it would not happen, and the troops would be home by Christmas. Paperwork was already underway to send the Army's Second Division to Europe. But if China were so foolish as to enter the war, they would be slaughtered.
MacArthur must be credited with outstanding military achievements during his WWII Pacific campaign, his presiding over the occupation and democratizing of Japan, and his insistence on the Inchon landing in Korea. But MacArthur was not always right. And when wrong, it would be with disastrous consequences.
Even as he was advising President Truman not to worry about Chinese intervention in Korea, Chinese troops were poised on the north banks of the Yalu. During the onset of winter, the Eighth Army, still clad in summer uniforms, dangerously extending their supply lines, and with trepidation of ground commanders, were ordered north. By then, close to a half million highly disciplined Chinese soldiers, well camouflaged, traveling light across the rugged North Korean mountains, and led by combat-seasoned officers and non-coms, had entered Korea, undetected. The U.N. "race to the Yalu" was a deadly walk into a giant trap set by the Chinese.
The point here is not whether U.N. forces should have pushed north - that's a debate for another time. The point is that China saw U.N. forces, mainly American, as a major threat as they advanced toward the Yalu. As China had warned - warnings ignored by MacArthur and the Truman administration - and the Chinese reacted violently to the possibility of Americans on the border of Manchuria.
Were America and the United Nations posing a real threat to China? What's relevant here is that the Chinese certainly thought so, particularly as General MacArthur was urging bombing the mainland, including using atomic bombs. Perceiving a threat, China reacted.
Consider a hypothetical case. If the Chinese army were in Mexico, pushing north toward the Rio Grande, America would not tolerate it, and would react.
That's hypothetical. But Cuba is a real case. With Fidel Castro establishing a socialist state and proclaiming allegiance with the Soviet Union, the Cuban revolution of 1959 was seen as a threat to America. America reacted, albeit with questionable wisdom.
General Fulgencia Batista, in a military coup, had seized power in Cuba in 1952. His was a dictatorial regime that forged links to organized crime and, to the chagrin of ordinary Cubans, allowed American companies to dominate the Cuban economy. His strongly anti-communist stance gained American political and military support - this was, after all, during the Cold War.
Opponents of the Batista regime had engaged in years of armed rebellion, culminating with the successful revolution led by the Castro Brothers in 1959. Batista fled into exile with his amassed fortune.
Castro's Cuban government soon got into trouble with the United States, expropriating and nationalizing American Esso and Standard Oil, and Anglo-Dutch Shell Oil. In retaliation, the U.S. canceled its imports of Cuban sugar. It was downhill from there.
Castro nationalized U.S-owned assets on the island, including banks and sugar mills. The U.S. prohibited the majority of its exports to Cuba. Cuba seized and nationalized control of U.S. companies including Coca-Cola and Sears.
In August 1960, American Secretary of State Christian Herter laid his cards on the table, labeling Castro's administration as "following faithfully the Bolshevik pattern," a single-party system with governmental control of trade unions, suppressing civil liberties, and on and on.
Castro responded by blasting American treatment of black people and working classes, missing no opportunity to lampoon the United States. Secretary of State Herter asserted that international communism was using Cuba as an "operational base" for spreading revolution in the western hemisphere, and called on members of the Organization of American States (OAS) to condemn the Cuban government for its breach of human rights.
With the successful Castro-led Cuban Revolution now in power, counter-revolutionary groups developed, attempting to overthrow the new regime. Opponents of the Castro regime had fled Cuba, many to Florida from where they were among those who funded groups taking up armed attacks against Castro's forces.
Castro cracked down on members of the opposition and subjected dissidents to confinement. He tightened up press censorship.
American-Cuba relationships quickly reached low ebb. After all, the Cold War was in full swing, and here we had an anti-American, communist dictatorship "90 miles from our shores."
Next week: American reaction - a classic exercise in futility.
- John Waelti's column appears every Friday in the Times. He can be reached at jjwaelti1@tds.net.
Among things that nations, whether communist, socialist, or capitalist, have in common is hostile reaction to threats, whether real or perceived. It was a threat to America, whether real or perceived, that led to the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion back in 1961.
A look back to a prior decade is instructive. Autumn 1950, the Korean War - based on their experience with amphibious landings, the Navy and Marine Corps, along with the Joint Chiefs, had opposed General MacArthur's plan for the amphibious landing at Inchon. The narrow harbor, the fluctuating tides with exposed mud flats - it was too risky.
MacArthur persisted, and convinced his critics. Against the advice of Soviet and Chinese advisors who had studied MacArthur and anticipated an amphibious landing, possibly at Inchon, Kim Il Sung had not mined the narrow harbor. The landing succeeded beyond even MacArthur's expectations, further enhancing his reputation. With the North Korean army in shambles, there was enormous political and military pressure for the United Nations forces to push north to the Yalu River, the border between Korea and Manchuria.
When President Truman questioned MacArthur about the possibility of China entering the war, he assured the president that it would not happen, and the troops would be home by Christmas. Paperwork was already underway to send the Army's Second Division to Europe. But if China were so foolish as to enter the war, they would be slaughtered.
MacArthur must be credited with outstanding military achievements during his WWII Pacific campaign, his presiding over the occupation and democratizing of Japan, and his insistence on the Inchon landing in Korea. But MacArthur was not always right. And when wrong, it would be with disastrous consequences.
Even as he was advising President Truman not to worry about Chinese intervention in Korea, Chinese troops were poised on the north banks of the Yalu. During the onset of winter, the Eighth Army, still clad in summer uniforms, dangerously extending their supply lines, and with trepidation of ground commanders, were ordered north. By then, close to a half million highly disciplined Chinese soldiers, well camouflaged, traveling light across the rugged North Korean mountains, and led by combat-seasoned officers and non-coms, had entered Korea, undetected. The U.N. "race to the Yalu" was a deadly walk into a giant trap set by the Chinese.
The point here is not whether U.N. forces should have pushed north - that's a debate for another time. The point is that China saw U.N. forces, mainly American, as a major threat as they advanced toward the Yalu. As China had warned - warnings ignored by MacArthur and the Truman administration - and the Chinese reacted violently to the possibility of Americans on the border of Manchuria.
Were America and the United Nations posing a real threat to China? What's relevant here is that the Chinese certainly thought so, particularly as General MacArthur was urging bombing the mainland, including using atomic bombs. Perceiving a threat, China reacted.
Consider a hypothetical case. If the Chinese army were in Mexico, pushing north toward the Rio Grande, America would not tolerate it, and would react.
That's hypothetical. But Cuba is a real case. With Fidel Castro establishing a socialist state and proclaiming allegiance with the Soviet Union, the Cuban revolution of 1959 was seen as a threat to America. America reacted, albeit with questionable wisdom.
General Fulgencia Batista, in a military coup, had seized power in Cuba in 1952. His was a dictatorial regime that forged links to organized crime and, to the chagrin of ordinary Cubans, allowed American companies to dominate the Cuban economy. His strongly anti-communist stance gained American political and military support - this was, after all, during the Cold War.
Opponents of the Batista regime had engaged in years of armed rebellion, culminating with the successful revolution led by the Castro Brothers in 1959. Batista fled into exile with his amassed fortune.
Castro's Cuban government soon got into trouble with the United States, expropriating and nationalizing American Esso and Standard Oil, and Anglo-Dutch Shell Oil. In retaliation, the U.S. canceled its imports of Cuban sugar. It was downhill from there.
Castro nationalized U.S-owned assets on the island, including banks and sugar mills. The U.S. prohibited the majority of its exports to Cuba. Cuba seized and nationalized control of U.S. companies including Coca-Cola and Sears.
In August 1960, American Secretary of State Christian Herter laid his cards on the table, labeling Castro's administration as "following faithfully the Bolshevik pattern," a single-party system with governmental control of trade unions, suppressing civil liberties, and on and on.
Castro responded by blasting American treatment of black people and working classes, missing no opportunity to lampoon the United States. Secretary of State Herter asserted that international communism was using Cuba as an "operational base" for spreading revolution in the western hemisphere, and called on members of the Organization of American States (OAS) to condemn the Cuban government for its breach of human rights.
With the successful Castro-led Cuban Revolution now in power, counter-revolutionary groups developed, attempting to overthrow the new regime. Opponents of the Castro regime had fled Cuba, many to Florida from where they were among those who funded groups taking up armed attacks against Castro's forces.
Castro cracked down on members of the opposition and subjected dissidents to confinement. He tightened up press censorship.
American-Cuba relationships quickly reached low ebb. After all, the Cold War was in full swing, and here we had an anti-American, communist dictatorship "90 miles from our shores."
Next week: American reaction - a classic exercise in futility.
- John Waelti's column appears every Friday in the Times. He can be reached at jjwaelti1@tds.net.
