Sometimes war is inevitable. Once Japanese bombs were dropped on Pearl Harbor and Adolph Hitler rolled over Europe with his policy of genocide, the die was cast. When the North Korean army crossed the 38th parallel in 1950, American intervention was inevitable.
The unpopular Korean War, referred to as "the forgotten war" is often said to have "failed" for having ended in a stalemate. That's an unfair assessment. The objective of keeping South Korea from communist takeover was achieved.
South Korea's president during the 1950s, Syngman Rhee, was no paragon of democratic virtues. But he was eventually replaced, and South Korea went on to become a burgeoning capitalist society, labeled by economists as one of the "four tigers." American military involvement was, in that sense, not in vain. While South Korea flourished, North Korea languished and its people continue to suffer under communist rule.
But was that unpopular war avoidable? Probably not, at least in the political sense. It is difficult for anyone under the age of 80 and not versed in history - that includes today's politicians and chattering class of the electronic media - to comprehend the tremendous political pressure on President Truman in 1950.
After two decades of Democratic control of the presidency and the Congress, frustrated Republicans had finally found their highly effective campaign issue: "Democrats lost China" to the communists.
Fueled by highly effective public relations and a lobbying campaign led by Madame Chiang, the charismatic wife of Chinese Nationalist President Chiang Kai Shek, and American Christian missionaries, American sympathy for China was high. However, vast amounts of military equipment sent to Chiang's ineffective Nationalist Army fell into Communist hands as fast as it arrived. As Chinese peasants ignored by the corrupt Chiang were recruited by Mao Zedong's Communist army, the end result was inevitable. In 1949, Communist takeover of mainland China was complete; Chiang took refuge on the island of Formosa, later renamed "Taiwan."
Republicans hammered President Truman and the Democrats for not having done enough to "save China." Compounding the narrative was that in 1947 the Soviet Union became a nuclear power. The effective Republican slogan of that era was that Democrats were "soft on Communism."
On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army, led by battle-tested officers and NCOs, rolled over the 38th parallel and rapidly pushed the ineffective South Korean army south.
Hammered by Republicans for having "lost China," and South Korea certain to fall to the Communists, the pressure on President Truman was enormous. Under the aegis of the United Nations, America intervened.
The North Korean invasion pushed south, with U.N. forces nearly pushed into the sea. The successful amphibious invasion at Inchon in September 1950 turned the war around and destroyed much of the North Korean army. With that success, the incentive to push into North Korea all the way to the Chinese border was irresistible.
By October, upwards of 300,000 Chinese troops had crossed the Yalu River under cover of darkness and, with remarkable skill, concealed themselves from detection by American scouting planes. A giant, elaborate trap was being set.
On the west side of the peninsula, the Army's 1st and 9th Corps pushed north, with the 2nd Division the most vulnerable. On the east side of the peninsula, the X Corps, consisting of the 1st Marine Division and the Army's 7th Division, pushed north from the port of Wonson.
On the west side, as Army units pushed north, they met only token resistance. A few Communist Chinese troops were captured but dismissed as mere stragglers. American forces became dangerously extended, even as the well-concealed Chinese troops knew the precise position of every American unit.
On Nov. 25, the Chinese sprung the trap and attacked in force. The 2nd Division was routed, forced to retreat. From Kunuri through a narrow valley, disorganized, strung-out units were ambushed from hillsides on both sides of the valley. In one of the most disastrous defeats suffered by the U.S. Army, the 2nd Division was effectively destroyed, having to be rebuilt as an effective fighting force.
On the east side of the peninsula, 1st Marine Division Commander Oliver Smith sensed the trap that X Corps was being sucked into. The Marines and the Army's 7th Division reached the "frozen Chosin" Reservoir. Committing near insubordination, General Smith resisted Corps Commander Army General Ned Almond's orders to "race to the Yalu." Instead, he kept the Division's three regiments tightly enough together to resist the Chinese objective of annihilating the elite 1st Marine Division.
While battling freezing cold temperatures and destroying thousands of Chinese army troops in the process, the Marines were able to fight their way back to the port of Wonson in one of the epic sagas of the Korean War.
With Chinese entry into the war and U.N. forces rolled back, the war had reached a low point. General MacArthur was replaced by General Mathew Ridgeway. Ridgeway promptly sacked corps commanders and generals, including the unfortunate 2nd Division Commander, Dutch Kaiser, who was (unfairly) blamed for loss of the 2nd Division. Smith insisted that he never again be placed under the command of MacArthur's lackey, Almond. Ridgeway agreed.
With China in the war, invasion of the rugged mountainous terrain of North Korea was out of the question. America was not ready for war with mainland China. Nor was abandonment of South Korea to the communists a satisfactory option.
The least unsatisfactory option was a holding action.
General Ridgeway understood the limitations under which he operated. He did a masterful job of rebuilding the Army's decimated forces and winning some crucial battles.
Held responsible for the unpopular "Truman's War," Truman declined running for re-election in 1952. Former European Theater Commander Dwight Eisenhower ran in 1952, promising to go to Korea. He did, and the truce currently in force was signed in July 1953. American troops have remained there since.
Next week: Subsequent wars were, and are, avoidable.
- John Waelti of Monroe, a retired professor of economics, can be reached at jjwaelti1@tds.net. His column appears Fridays in the Monroe Times.
The unpopular Korean War, referred to as "the forgotten war" is often said to have "failed" for having ended in a stalemate. That's an unfair assessment. The objective of keeping South Korea from communist takeover was achieved.
South Korea's president during the 1950s, Syngman Rhee, was no paragon of democratic virtues. But he was eventually replaced, and South Korea went on to become a burgeoning capitalist society, labeled by economists as one of the "four tigers." American military involvement was, in that sense, not in vain. While South Korea flourished, North Korea languished and its people continue to suffer under communist rule.
But was that unpopular war avoidable? Probably not, at least in the political sense. It is difficult for anyone under the age of 80 and not versed in history - that includes today's politicians and chattering class of the electronic media - to comprehend the tremendous political pressure on President Truman in 1950.
After two decades of Democratic control of the presidency and the Congress, frustrated Republicans had finally found their highly effective campaign issue: "Democrats lost China" to the communists.
Fueled by highly effective public relations and a lobbying campaign led by Madame Chiang, the charismatic wife of Chinese Nationalist President Chiang Kai Shek, and American Christian missionaries, American sympathy for China was high. However, vast amounts of military equipment sent to Chiang's ineffective Nationalist Army fell into Communist hands as fast as it arrived. As Chinese peasants ignored by the corrupt Chiang were recruited by Mao Zedong's Communist army, the end result was inevitable. In 1949, Communist takeover of mainland China was complete; Chiang took refuge on the island of Formosa, later renamed "Taiwan."
Republicans hammered President Truman and the Democrats for not having done enough to "save China." Compounding the narrative was that in 1947 the Soviet Union became a nuclear power. The effective Republican slogan of that era was that Democrats were "soft on Communism."
On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army, led by battle-tested officers and NCOs, rolled over the 38th parallel and rapidly pushed the ineffective South Korean army south.
Hammered by Republicans for having "lost China," and South Korea certain to fall to the Communists, the pressure on President Truman was enormous. Under the aegis of the United Nations, America intervened.
The North Korean invasion pushed south, with U.N. forces nearly pushed into the sea. The successful amphibious invasion at Inchon in September 1950 turned the war around and destroyed much of the North Korean army. With that success, the incentive to push into North Korea all the way to the Chinese border was irresistible.
By October, upwards of 300,000 Chinese troops had crossed the Yalu River under cover of darkness and, with remarkable skill, concealed themselves from detection by American scouting planes. A giant, elaborate trap was being set.
On the west side of the peninsula, the Army's 1st and 9th Corps pushed north, with the 2nd Division the most vulnerable. On the east side of the peninsula, the X Corps, consisting of the 1st Marine Division and the Army's 7th Division, pushed north from the port of Wonson.
On the west side, as Army units pushed north, they met only token resistance. A few Communist Chinese troops were captured but dismissed as mere stragglers. American forces became dangerously extended, even as the well-concealed Chinese troops knew the precise position of every American unit.
On Nov. 25, the Chinese sprung the trap and attacked in force. The 2nd Division was routed, forced to retreat. From Kunuri through a narrow valley, disorganized, strung-out units were ambushed from hillsides on both sides of the valley. In one of the most disastrous defeats suffered by the U.S. Army, the 2nd Division was effectively destroyed, having to be rebuilt as an effective fighting force.
On the east side of the peninsula, 1st Marine Division Commander Oliver Smith sensed the trap that X Corps was being sucked into. The Marines and the Army's 7th Division reached the "frozen Chosin" Reservoir. Committing near insubordination, General Smith resisted Corps Commander Army General Ned Almond's orders to "race to the Yalu." Instead, he kept the Division's three regiments tightly enough together to resist the Chinese objective of annihilating the elite 1st Marine Division.
While battling freezing cold temperatures and destroying thousands of Chinese army troops in the process, the Marines were able to fight their way back to the port of Wonson in one of the epic sagas of the Korean War.
With Chinese entry into the war and U.N. forces rolled back, the war had reached a low point. General MacArthur was replaced by General Mathew Ridgeway. Ridgeway promptly sacked corps commanders and generals, including the unfortunate 2nd Division Commander, Dutch Kaiser, who was (unfairly) blamed for loss of the 2nd Division. Smith insisted that he never again be placed under the command of MacArthur's lackey, Almond. Ridgeway agreed.
With China in the war, invasion of the rugged mountainous terrain of North Korea was out of the question. America was not ready for war with mainland China. Nor was abandonment of South Korea to the communists a satisfactory option.
The least unsatisfactory option was a holding action.
General Ridgeway understood the limitations under which he operated. He did a masterful job of rebuilding the Army's decimated forces and winning some crucial battles.
Held responsible for the unpopular "Truman's War," Truman declined running for re-election in 1952. Former European Theater Commander Dwight Eisenhower ran in 1952, promising to go to Korea. He did, and the truce currently in force was signed in July 1953. American troops have remained there since.
Next week: Subsequent wars were, and are, avoidable.
- John Waelti of Monroe, a retired professor of economics, can be reached at jjwaelti1@tds.net. His column appears Fridays in the Monroe Times.
