The majority of Americans born after the 1950s have no conception of how unpopular the Korean War was at the time.
Even today, the "forgotten war," known at the time as "Truman's war," is viewed as less than victorious as the demilitarized zone is roughly along the 38th parallel that divided North and South Korea in 1950. Nevertheless, the primary objective of keeping South Korea out of communist hands was achieved. South Korea went on to become a prosperous capitalist society while North Koreans continue to suffer under a stagnant economy and repressive communist rule.
The Korean War, so unpopular at the time, was largely responsible for President Harry Truman not running for re-election in 1952. One could not have predicted that another unpopular war would result in the same fate for another president some 16 years later.
The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed in July 1953. Less than two years later, May 1954, with the battle of Dien Bien Phu, the French were evicted from Vietnam. That Southeast Asian nation had long been dominated by its neighbor to the north, China. It was colonized by France until World War II when the Japanese took over Southeast Asia, kicking out France along with the British and Dutch colonial powers. With the defeat of Japanese fighters, the French returned to Vietnam until their loss at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.
The subsequent history of Vietnam is very complex. Let's review some basics.
At the Geneva Accords of 1954, Vietnam was partitioned at the 17th parallel. North Vietnam was supported by the Soviet Union and its communist allies. South Vietnam was backed by the U.S. and its allies. Complicating matters was the Viet Cong, a military arm of the National Liberation Front, in South Vietnam waging guerilla war against the southern rulers.
When the French lost that fateful battle in 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower found himself in the same box as Truman in 1950. Would America "lose" another nation to communism, as Democrats were accused of having "lost China?"
Eisenhower sent the general responsible for turning the war around in Korea, Matt Ridgeway, to report on the situation in Vietnam. Ridgeway's report made no specific recommendation but rendered his best assessment of the high costs of American military intervention.
Eisenhower early on bought into the domino theory that if another Asian country fell to communism, the rest of Southeast Asia would follow. But he also saw the futility of a land war in Asia. He finessed his way out of the dilemma by sending advisors to assist the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.
When President John F. Kennedy was elected in 1960, he stayed with the Cold War foreign policies of Truman and Eisenhower, finding himself in a box partly of his own making. He had promised to "draw a line in the sand" and prevent a communist Vietnam. Yet, he opposed deployment of American combat troops. Kennedy rejected a hare-brained scheme recommended by advisors Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow to send combat troops to South Vietnam disguised as flood relief workers.
In 1962, John Kenneth Galbraith warned Kennedy of the danger of replacing the French as a colonial force. But by 1963, there were 16,000 American military personnel in South Vietnam, up from Eisenhower's 900 advisors.
The south Vietnamese Army remained ineffective. A strategic hamlet program initiated in 1961 failed. In a U.S.-backed coup, the corrupt President Ngo Dinh Diem was overthrown and executed. JFK had not anticipated Diem's murder. Chaos reigned.
U.S. military advisors, embedded at every level of the South Vietnamese armed forces, were criticized for ignoring the political nature of the insurgency. The Kennedy administration sought to refocus effort on "winning over hearts and minds." Washington's military leadership opposed any role other than conventional troop training.
General Paul Harkins, commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, predicted victory by Christmas 1963. The CIA rendered a soberer assessment.
By that time, JFK's brother Robert, who was initially hawkish, realized that optimistic reports coming through the embassy did not match events happening in the field after a visit to Vietnam.
Further escalation of the war would be costly and disastrous. Withdrawal would leave JFK open to the charge of "losing Vietnam." A decision, especially if it was to withdraw, would have to wait until after the election of 1964.
We don't know the course of American involvement had JFK not been assassinated in November 1963.
His successor, President Lyndon B. Johnson, escalated the war with the Gulf of Tonkin incident in October 1964. The U.S. Senate, by vote of 98-2, approved military escalation.
As the war became more divisive, costly and unpopular, Bobby Kennedy became an anti-war candidate for the presidency of 1968. Having suffered unexpected setbacks in early primaries, LBJ decided not to run.
We can't know the course of events had Bobby Kennedy not been assassinated in 1968.
Richard Nixon, winning the election of 1968, promised to end the war but escalated it instead with the bombing of Laos. He turned to another failed concept, "Vietnamization." That was like pushing string. No amount of "training" a foreign army can compensate for lack of motivation of troops to put their lives on the line for a cause in which they don't firmly believe. America has yet to learn this lesson.
David Halberstam's "The Best and the Brightest" should be required reading for every American politician. It is a classic, detailing how mindless "groupthink" and failure to consult knowledgeable professionals can lead to disaster.
Among the war's casualties was LBJ himself. It was LBJ, a savvy white southern Democrat, who got the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 through Congress. Only he could have done it. LBJ is responsible for Medicare, which is central to the physical and economic health of everybody who is, and will be, over age 65.
LBJ would surely be hailed as one of the greatest American presidents were his noble historic accomplishments not overshadowed by the tragic war that could have been avoided.
- John Waelti of Monroe, a retired professor of economics, can be reached at jjwaelti1@tds.net.
His column appears Fridays in the Monroe Times.
Even today, the "forgotten war," known at the time as "Truman's war," is viewed as less than victorious as the demilitarized zone is roughly along the 38th parallel that divided North and South Korea in 1950. Nevertheless, the primary objective of keeping South Korea out of communist hands was achieved. South Korea went on to become a prosperous capitalist society while North Koreans continue to suffer under a stagnant economy and repressive communist rule.
The Korean War, so unpopular at the time, was largely responsible for President Harry Truman not running for re-election in 1952. One could not have predicted that another unpopular war would result in the same fate for another president some 16 years later.
The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed in July 1953. Less than two years later, May 1954, with the battle of Dien Bien Phu, the French were evicted from Vietnam. That Southeast Asian nation had long been dominated by its neighbor to the north, China. It was colonized by France until World War II when the Japanese took over Southeast Asia, kicking out France along with the British and Dutch colonial powers. With the defeat of Japanese fighters, the French returned to Vietnam until their loss at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.
The subsequent history of Vietnam is very complex. Let's review some basics.
At the Geneva Accords of 1954, Vietnam was partitioned at the 17th parallel. North Vietnam was supported by the Soviet Union and its communist allies. South Vietnam was backed by the U.S. and its allies. Complicating matters was the Viet Cong, a military arm of the National Liberation Front, in South Vietnam waging guerilla war against the southern rulers.
When the French lost that fateful battle in 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower found himself in the same box as Truman in 1950. Would America "lose" another nation to communism, as Democrats were accused of having "lost China?"
Eisenhower sent the general responsible for turning the war around in Korea, Matt Ridgeway, to report on the situation in Vietnam. Ridgeway's report made no specific recommendation but rendered his best assessment of the high costs of American military intervention.
Eisenhower early on bought into the domino theory that if another Asian country fell to communism, the rest of Southeast Asia would follow. But he also saw the futility of a land war in Asia. He finessed his way out of the dilemma by sending advisors to assist the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.
When President John F. Kennedy was elected in 1960, he stayed with the Cold War foreign policies of Truman and Eisenhower, finding himself in a box partly of his own making. He had promised to "draw a line in the sand" and prevent a communist Vietnam. Yet, he opposed deployment of American combat troops. Kennedy rejected a hare-brained scheme recommended by advisors Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow to send combat troops to South Vietnam disguised as flood relief workers.
In 1962, John Kenneth Galbraith warned Kennedy of the danger of replacing the French as a colonial force. But by 1963, there were 16,000 American military personnel in South Vietnam, up from Eisenhower's 900 advisors.
The south Vietnamese Army remained ineffective. A strategic hamlet program initiated in 1961 failed. In a U.S.-backed coup, the corrupt President Ngo Dinh Diem was overthrown and executed. JFK had not anticipated Diem's murder. Chaos reigned.
U.S. military advisors, embedded at every level of the South Vietnamese armed forces, were criticized for ignoring the political nature of the insurgency. The Kennedy administration sought to refocus effort on "winning over hearts and minds." Washington's military leadership opposed any role other than conventional troop training.
General Paul Harkins, commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, predicted victory by Christmas 1963. The CIA rendered a soberer assessment.
By that time, JFK's brother Robert, who was initially hawkish, realized that optimistic reports coming through the embassy did not match events happening in the field after a visit to Vietnam.
Further escalation of the war would be costly and disastrous. Withdrawal would leave JFK open to the charge of "losing Vietnam." A decision, especially if it was to withdraw, would have to wait until after the election of 1964.
We don't know the course of American involvement had JFK not been assassinated in November 1963.
His successor, President Lyndon B. Johnson, escalated the war with the Gulf of Tonkin incident in October 1964. The U.S. Senate, by vote of 98-2, approved military escalation.
As the war became more divisive, costly and unpopular, Bobby Kennedy became an anti-war candidate for the presidency of 1968. Having suffered unexpected setbacks in early primaries, LBJ decided not to run.
We can't know the course of events had Bobby Kennedy not been assassinated in 1968.
Richard Nixon, winning the election of 1968, promised to end the war but escalated it instead with the bombing of Laos. He turned to another failed concept, "Vietnamization." That was like pushing string. No amount of "training" a foreign army can compensate for lack of motivation of troops to put their lives on the line for a cause in which they don't firmly believe. America has yet to learn this lesson.
David Halberstam's "The Best and the Brightest" should be required reading for every American politician. It is a classic, detailing how mindless "groupthink" and failure to consult knowledgeable professionals can lead to disaster.
Among the war's casualties was LBJ himself. It was LBJ, a savvy white southern Democrat, who got the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 through Congress. Only he could have done it. LBJ is responsible for Medicare, which is central to the physical and economic health of everybody who is, and will be, over age 65.
LBJ would surely be hailed as one of the greatest American presidents were his noble historic accomplishments not overshadowed by the tragic war that could have been avoided.
- John Waelti of Monroe, a retired professor of economics, can be reached at jjwaelti1@tds.net.
His column appears Fridays in the Monroe Times.
