With the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ending World War II, it was naively assumed that the days of infantry were over. With emphasis on nuclear weapons, the Air Force became the darling of the military services, Army training and weapons development neglected.
August 1950 - United Nations forces consisting of ineffective troops of the Republic of Korea (ROK), and those of the ill-trained, understrength 24th Division lifted from soft occupation duty in Japan, were defending the southeast corner of Korea, known as the Pusan Perimeter. Tough North Korean army troops led by combat tested officers and NCOs were making an all-out attempt to push them into the sea.
With UN forces in peril, General MacArthur conceived a historic military maneuver, the amphibious landing at the port city of Inchon.
The Navy and Marine Corps initially opposed Inchon as the landing site. The tricky tides, the narrow channel, everything was wrong with that site. But MacArthur, a master of persuasion, convinced the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington that it was a risk worth taking.
Soviet and Chinese military scholars had studied MacArthur's World War II strategy and warned North Korea's president, Kim Il Sung, to expect MacArthur to execute an amphibious landing, with Inchon a possible site.
Fortunately, Kim, ignoring Soviet and Chinese military advice, had not yet mined the harbor. The amphibious landing took the enemy by total surprise. With amazingly light casualties, the beachhead was secured and Marines pushed eastward toward Seoul.
It was arguably the high point of MacArthur's brilliant military career. However, the incredible success of the Inchon landing made MacArthur untouchable by politicians and the Joint Chiefs in Washington, leading to succeeding serious career-ending errors.
First Marine Division commander, General Oliver Smith, recommended extending the front entirely across the Peninsula, cutting off the escape route of the trapped North Koreans. He was overruled by MacArthur, ordered to first recapture Seoul. MacArthur wanted to return Seoul to President Syngman Rhee by Sept. 25, the third month anniversary of the North Korean invasion. The Marines recaptured Seoul, but the diversion allowed some 20,000 North Koreans to escape the trap and fight another day.
Nevertheless, with MacArthur's success and the North Korean Army heavily damaged, there was no resisting temptation to push north to the Yalu, capturing North Korea and punishing the communists for their initial invasion.
Warnings had been received through various channels of possible Chinese intervention. MacArthur would hear none of it. He insisted that if the Chinese were to intervene, they would already have done so. And if they were to cross the Yalu River, U.S. air power would prevent their movement south.
Brilliant strategist though he was, MacArthur is criticized by military historians in this case for violating a cardinal principle, "Know your enemy." MacArthur had no respect for the Chinese Army, failing to understand why and how Mao's communist Army had defeated Chiang Kai-shek's better equipped Nationalist Army.
Even as MacArthur denied that China would enter Korea, upwards of 350,000 Chinese troops had already crossed the Yalu, having expertly avoided detection by American scouting planes. A giant trap was awaiting the dangerously exposed UN forces racing north - in frigid temperatures, some still in summer uniforms.
General Walton Walker's 8th Army, meeting only token resistance, pushing north on the west side of the peninsula, captured a few Chinese soldiers. These were dismissed by MacArthur Headquarters as volunteer stragglers.
MacArthur spoke of victorious American troops home by Christmas. The paperwork was soon to be started for transferring the ill-fated 2nd Infantry Division to Europe.
Highly disciplined masters of concealment, the Chinese would spring one of the most successful traps in modern military history. In early November the Chinese struck with devastating fury.
The entire 8th Army was pushed back across the 38th parallel, Seoul recaptured by the communists. The Army's elite 1st Cavalry Division was badly bloodied. The 2nd Division was routed, unit cohesion completely destroyed in its attempted escape through a narrow valley. Division Commander Dutch Kaiser, an obvious scapegoat, was sacked for having virtually lost his Division.
Soon after, 8th Army commander Walton Walker was killed in a jeep accident. Newly installed Commander Matthew Ridgway sacked weak Corps commanders who had received reports of Chinese troops but had been unwilling or unable to convince MacArthur of realities in the field.
With that devastating defeat of UN forces, MacArthur pushed for broadening the war, including possible nuclear bombing of China.
Why didn't this happen?
The Air Force could bomb North Korean cities and villages with impunity, and did. Current President Kim reminds North Koreans of this at every opportunity.
Taking North Korea's mountainous landmass that favored tough Chinese troops, masters of concealment, able to survive on short rations and not "road bound" as was the American army, was another matter. The U.S. was not ready for that kind of war.
And neither was it ready for total war with China.
MacArthur broke military protocol by performing political "end runs" around President Truman, writing letters to Republican congressmen, blaming Washington for defeat. Truman had no choice but to sack him.
Sacking the charismatic general was a tough decision. MacArthur's farewell "Old Warriors Never Die" speech to Congress was "vintage MacArthur." Those of us who were around at that time recall how the nation was so divided over Truman's audacity to fire him. That, along with being held responsible for the unpopular war, ended Truman's feasibility of running for re-election in 1952.
The truce signed in July 1953 did not formally end the war. American troops remained stationed along the demilitarized zone. America, South Korea and Japan continue joint military exercises close to North Korea as it develops its nuclear program.
Enter President Trump and his acceptance of Kim's invitation to talk. While encouraging, there are serious obstacles to overcome if we are to prevent another Korean War - a war that must not be fought.
Next week: Opportunities and pitfalls of peace talks.
- John Waelti of Monroe, a retired professor of economics, can be reached at jjwaelti1@tds.net. His column appears Fridays in the Monroe Times.
August 1950 - United Nations forces consisting of ineffective troops of the Republic of Korea (ROK), and those of the ill-trained, understrength 24th Division lifted from soft occupation duty in Japan, were defending the southeast corner of Korea, known as the Pusan Perimeter. Tough North Korean army troops led by combat tested officers and NCOs were making an all-out attempt to push them into the sea.
With UN forces in peril, General MacArthur conceived a historic military maneuver, the amphibious landing at the port city of Inchon.
The Navy and Marine Corps initially opposed Inchon as the landing site. The tricky tides, the narrow channel, everything was wrong with that site. But MacArthur, a master of persuasion, convinced the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington that it was a risk worth taking.
Soviet and Chinese military scholars had studied MacArthur's World War II strategy and warned North Korea's president, Kim Il Sung, to expect MacArthur to execute an amphibious landing, with Inchon a possible site.
Fortunately, Kim, ignoring Soviet and Chinese military advice, had not yet mined the harbor. The amphibious landing took the enemy by total surprise. With amazingly light casualties, the beachhead was secured and Marines pushed eastward toward Seoul.
It was arguably the high point of MacArthur's brilliant military career. However, the incredible success of the Inchon landing made MacArthur untouchable by politicians and the Joint Chiefs in Washington, leading to succeeding serious career-ending errors.
First Marine Division commander, General Oliver Smith, recommended extending the front entirely across the Peninsula, cutting off the escape route of the trapped North Koreans. He was overruled by MacArthur, ordered to first recapture Seoul. MacArthur wanted to return Seoul to President Syngman Rhee by Sept. 25, the third month anniversary of the North Korean invasion. The Marines recaptured Seoul, but the diversion allowed some 20,000 North Koreans to escape the trap and fight another day.
Nevertheless, with MacArthur's success and the North Korean Army heavily damaged, there was no resisting temptation to push north to the Yalu, capturing North Korea and punishing the communists for their initial invasion.
Warnings had been received through various channels of possible Chinese intervention. MacArthur would hear none of it. He insisted that if the Chinese were to intervene, they would already have done so. And if they were to cross the Yalu River, U.S. air power would prevent their movement south.
Brilliant strategist though he was, MacArthur is criticized by military historians in this case for violating a cardinal principle, "Know your enemy." MacArthur had no respect for the Chinese Army, failing to understand why and how Mao's communist Army had defeated Chiang Kai-shek's better equipped Nationalist Army.
Even as MacArthur denied that China would enter Korea, upwards of 350,000 Chinese troops had already crossed the Yalu, having expertly avoided detection by American scouting planes. A giant trap was awaiting the dangerously exposed UN forces racing north - in frigid temperatures, some still in summer uniforms.
General Walton Walker's 8th Army, meeting only token resistance, pushing north on the west side of the peninsula, captured a few Chinese soldiers. These were dismissed by MacArthur Headquarters as volunteer stragglers.
MacArthur spoke of victorious American troops home by Christmas. The paperwork was soon to be started for transferring the ill-fated 2nd Infantry Division to Europe.
Highly disciplined masters of concealment, the Chinese would spring one of the most successful traps in modern military history. In early November the Chinese struck with devastating fury.
The entire 8th Army was pushed back across the 38th parallel, Seoul recaptured by the communists. The Army's elite 1st Cavalry Division was badly bloodied. The 2nd Division was routed, unit cohesion completely destroyed in its attempted escape through a narrow valley. Division Commander Dutch Kaiser, an obvious scapegoat, was sacked for having virtually lost his Division.
Soon after, 8th Army commander Walton Walker was killed in a jeep accident. Newly installed Commander Matthew Ridgway sacked weak Corps commanders who had received reports of Chinese troops but had been unwilling or unable to convince MacArthur of realities in the field.
With that devastating defeat of UN forces, MacArthur pushed for broadening the war, including possible nuclear bombing of China.
Why didn't this happen?
The Air Force could bomb North Korean cities and villages with impunity, and did. Current President Kim reminds North Koreans of this at every opportunity.
Taking North Korea's mountainous landmass that favored tough Chinese troops, masters of concealment, able to survive on short rations and not "road bound" as was the American army, was another matter. The U.S. was not ready for that kind of war.
And neither was it ready for total war with China.
MacArthur broke military protocol by performing political "end runs" around President Truman, writing letters to Republican congressmen, blaming Washington for defeat. Truman had no choice but to sack him.
Sacking the charismatic general was a tough decision. MacArthur's farewell "Old Warriors Never Die" speech to Congress was "vintage MacArthur." Those of us who were around at that time recall how the nation was so divided over Truman's audacity to fire him. That, along with being held responsible for the unpopular war, ended Truman's feasibility of running for re-election in 1952.
The truce signed in July 1953 did not formally end the war. American troops remained stationed along the demilitarized zone. America, South Korea and Japan continue joint military exercises close to North Korea as it develops its nuclear program.
Enter President Trump and his acceptance of Kim's invitation to talk. While encouraging, there are serious obstacles to overcome if we are to prevent another Korean War - a war that must not be fought.
Next week: Opportunities and pitfalls of peace talks.
- John Waelti of Monroe, a retired professor of economics, can be reached at jjwaelti1@tds.net. His column appears Fridays in the Monroe Times.
