Logistics - it's all about logistics. Take, for example, the prospect of positioning a 70,000-strong column of soldiers. The most uncomplicated maneuver can quickly mire the entire assembly. Lack of communication, misunderstood orders, insubordinate underlings, and the sheer size of the group are all factors that conspire to create chaos.
The first day of the Battle at Gettysburg had been a Confederate victory. Elements of both armies had clashed in a series of skirmishes, but the Confederates held the initial upper hand and beat Union troops back through Gettysburg, to the strategic high ground southeast of town. Robert E. Lee's immediate subordinate was a general by the name of James Longstreet. Longstreet wanted to push the initiative by maneuvering the Confederate troops around and behind the Union lines, in order to draw them out.
Lee wanted to press the attack as much as Longstreet, but the two generals disagreed on tactics. Besides, Lee had another problem - he was fighting blind. During the Civil War, commanders relied on the quick maneuverability of cavalry scouts to provide reconnaissance of enemy movements and positions. Inexplicably, Lee's cavalry wing, his "eyes and ears," J.E.B. Stuart, was nowhere to be found. Stuart and his men had driven east in a series of raids and skirmishes with Union cavalry. Thus, as Lee and Longstreet considered how to best engage the Union Army, they were mostly unaware of the size and placement of their enemy.
Lee ultimately decided not to maneuver. Rather, his Confederates would take on the Union soldiers in a more direct, frontal assault. The men needed rest, and required time to get into position.
In just two days, the armies of North and South had assembled, bringing the total forces engaged to 165,000 soldiers (civilwar.org). More Union troops had arrived, thanks to a 35-mile all-night march. On Day Two, the Union held a line running north and south, just to the south of Gettysburg. They occupied the high ground, a series of knolls and a ridge known as Cemetery Hill. The Union line was bracketed on either side by more hills - Culps Hill to the Union right, and Little Round Top to the Union left.
Realizing the importance of those hills, Lee concentrated his attack on either flank of the Union army. At 4 p.m. on July 2, 1863, a mass of Confederate soldiers moved into position, intent on taking Little Round Top. If they succeeded, Southern artillery could rain down along the Union line, shattering the resistance.
Some 360 Union men from the 20th Maine Regiment quickly assembled to meet the Confederate flanking maneuver. Outnumbered nearly two to one, they had just 10 minutes to get into position. The southern boys were close, having advanced to point-blank range. An ultimatum had been given to the 20th Maine to hold Little Round Top "at all costs."
It is worthwhile to pause here, to consider what it must have been like for a soldier holding the line on a Civil War battlefield. Our Gettysburg tour guide affectionately referred to as "The Colonel," reached out his hand. He held an assortment of musket balls, artillery shrapnel, and minie balls. These were what the soldiers were hurling at each other, but getting shot by the enemy did not represent the only danger; even the simple act of firing a weapon could prove fatal.
A musket was loaded by ramming powder and a ball down the barrel. A percussion cap was carefully placed on the breech which, when fired, ignited the powder. A skilled rifleman could load and fire three shots in a minute. However, during the din of battle, with bullets whizzing and artillery exploding, the percussion cap could fall off. A soldier could pull the trigger, not realize his rifle had not fired, and reload another shot. Imagine a musket loaded with two or more charges - the resulting recoil would, and did, shatter many a man's shoulder. The colonel explained, "Following the battle, it was not uncommon to find muskets with up to six unexploded charges rammed down the barrel. Do you appreciate how scared you have to be, to load six shots without realizing not a single one fired?"
Chillingly, commanders during the Gettysburg Battle had been authorized to administer "instant death" to soldiers not performing their duty.
On Little Round Top, Union and Confederate soldiers clashed at point-blank range. So intense was the fighting that the individual pops of rifle fire quickly meshed into a constant roar. Outnumbered, the Northerners executed a textbook bayonet charge, so catching the Rebels off guard that they panicked, broke, and ran.
For the rest of the afternoon on the Union left flank, Confederate troops and Union troops charged, fell back, counterattacked, and traded ground at places with names like the Wheatfield, Peach Orchard, and a mass of boulders called Devil's Den. One veteran referred to the fighting as "hell on earth," while another claimed the balls flew so thick you could "hold out a hat and fill it full" (Ken Burns, Civil War).
By the end of the second day, bodies of the dead and wounded covered the ground on the Union's left flank. Blood had soaked the soil and pooled on the rocks, but the Union flanks had held.
Still, Lee considered the second day of battle a victory. The next day, July 3, against Longstreet's better judgment, he would hit the Union hard, right down the middle.
The worst was yet to come.
- Dan Wegmueller of Monroe writes a column for the Times each Tuesday. He can be reached at dwegs@tds.net.
The first day of the Battle at Gettysburg had been a Confederate victory. Elements of both armies had clashed in a series of skirmishes, but the Confederates held the initial upper hand and beat Union troops back through Gettysburg, to the strategic high ground southeast of town. Robert E. Lee's immediate subordinate was a general by the name of James Longstreet. Longstreet wanted to push the initiative by maneuvering the Confederate troops around and behind the Union lines, in order to draw them out.
Lee wanted to press the attack as much as Longstreet, but the two generals disagreed on tactics. Besides, Lee had another problem - he was fighting blind. During the Civil War, commanders relied on the quick maneuverability of cavalry scouts to provide reconnaissance of enemy movements and positions. Inexplicably, Lee's cavalry wing, his "eyes and ears," J.E.B. Stuart, was nowhere to be found. Stuart and his men had driven east in a series of raids and skirmishes with Union cavalry. Thus, as Lee and Longstreet considered how to best engage the Union Army, they were mostly unaware of the size and placement of their enemy.
Lee ultimately decided not to maneuver. Rather, his Confederates would take on the Union soldiers in a more direct, frontal assault. The men needed rest, and required time to get into position.
In just two days, the armies of North and South had assembled, bringing the total forces engaged to 165,000 soldiers (civilwar.org). More Union troops had arrived, thanks to a 35-mile all-night march. On Day Two, the Union held a line running north and south, just to the south of Gettysburg. They occupied the high ground, a series of knolls and a ridge known as Cemetery Hill. The Union line was bracketed on either side by more hills - Culps Hill to the Union right, and Little Round Top to the Union left.
Realizing the importance of those hills, Lee concentrated his attack on either flank of the Union army. At 4 p.m. on July 2, 1863, a mass of Confederate soldiers moved into position, intent on taking Little Round Top. If they succeeded, Southern artillery could rain down along the Union line, shattering the resistance.
Some 360 Union men from the 20th Maine Regiment quickly assembled to meet the Confederate flanking maneuver. Outnumbered nearly two to one, they had just 10 minutes to get into position. The southern boys were close, having advanced to point-blank range. An ultimatum had been given to the 20th Maine to hold Little Round Top "at all costs."
It is worthwhile to pause here, to consider what it must have been like for a soldier holding the line on a Civil War battlefield. Our Gettysburg tour guide affectionately referred to as "The Colonel," reached out his hand. He held an assortment of musket balls, artillery shrapnel, and minie balls. These were what the soldiers were hurling at each other, but getting shot by the enemy did not represent the only danger; even the simple act of firing a weapon could prove fatal.
A musket was loaded by ramming powder and a ball down the barrel. A percussion cap was carefully placed on the breech which, when fired, ignited the powder. A skilled rifleman could load and fire three shots in a minute. However, during the din of battle, with bullets whizzing and artillery exploding, the percussion cap could fall off. A soldier could pull the trigger, not realize his rifle had not fired, and reload another shot. Imagine a musket loaded with two or more charges - the resulting recoil would, and did, shatter many a man's shoulder. The colonel explained, "Following the battle, it was not uncommon to find muskets with up to six unexploded charges rammed down the barrel. Do you appreciate how scared you have to be, to load six shots without realizing not a single one fired?"
Chillingly, commanders during the Gettysburg Battle had been authorized to administer "instant death" to soldiers not performing their duty.
On Little Round Top, Union and Confederate soldiers clashed at point-blank range. So intense was the fighting that the individual pops of rifle fire quickly meshed into a constant roar. Outnumbered, the Northerners executed a textbook bayonet charge, so catching the Rebels off guard that they panicked, broke, and ran.
For the rest of the afternoon on the Union left flank, Confederate troops and Union troops charged, fell back, counterattacked, and traded ground at places with names like the Wheatfield, Peach Orchard, and a mass of boulders called Devil's Den. One veteran referred to the fighting as "hell on earth," while another claimed the balls flew so thick you could "hold out a hat and fill it full" (Ken Burns, Civil War).
By the end of the second day, bodies of the dead and wounded covered the ground on the Union's left flank. Blood had soaked the soil and pooled on the rocks, but the Union flanks had held.
Still, Lee considered the second day of battle a victory. The next day, July 3, against Longstreet's better judgment, he would hit the Union hard, right down the middle.
The worst was yet to come.
- Dan Wegmueller of Monroe writes a column for the Times each Tuesday. He can be reached at dwegs@tds.net.
