When discussions of WWII battles of the Pacific come up, it is familiar names like Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, Midway, Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Iwo Jima, occasionally Saipan, and the naval battles of the Coral Sea and the Philippine Sea. Okinawa, if mentioned at all, is almost an afterthought. Most people have heard of the Kamikazes, but few associate them with the Battle for Okinawa.
Of the countless WWII movies, ranging from the absurd to excellent, few feature the Battle of Okinawa - remarkable, as this was the largest and bloodiest battle of the Pacific War. If few Americans are vaguely aware of the Battle of Okinawa, even fewer are aware of its significance, and still fewer realize that in terms of personnel, ships, planes, and tonnage of supplies, the battle was larger than D-Day. It was, in fact, the largest combined air-land-sea battle in history.
How could this final battle of the war, the largest of all battles, become so lost to America's collective memory? In short, it is because the three-month long battle occurred within the period of March through August 1945 that turned the world upside down and changed it forever. Ironically, the war's end, and the history that the battle helped shape, caused the battle itself to lose its place in history.
To put this all-but-forgotten monumental battle in context, it is instructive to review the strategic considerations and events leading invasion of Okinawa instead of Formosa, as was planned earlier.
The grand objective of the Pacific campaign was to force Japan to unconditional surrender by reaching its industrial heart, concentrated along the southern shore of Honshu. The advance from Pearl Harbor across the Pacific would follow two main axes; one through the South and Southwest Pacific, led by General Douglas MacArthur, and the other through the Central Pacific, led by Admiral Chester Nimitz. As might be expected among strong and forceful commanders, there would be disagreement on strategy.
MacArthur's New Guinea campaign was to defend American and Australian bases from attack and, second, to secure bases from which to support his promised return to the Philippines. Until 1943, the Joint Chiefs could offer only words of encouragement to MacArthur, who was frustrated that the European war had precedence over the Pacific war.
The nation's top sailor, Admiral Ernest King, along with Pentagon planners, had opposed re-taking the Philippines with land forces, recommending only neutralizing it with air and naval bombardment. King's favored route was seizure of Formosa, code named Operation CAUSEWAY, using Formosa as the ultimate route to Japan.
The objective of Admiral Nimitz was to seize the Marianas. In this, he had the support of Admiral King as well as General Arnold, Commander of the Army Air Forces, who saw the Marianas as the launching place for his heavy bombers to strike the heart of Japan
The seizure of the Marshall Islands ahead of schedule in early 1944 by the Central Pacific forces paved the way for invasion of the Marianas. MacArthur opposed Nimitz's Marianas operation, but it had been approved by the Joint Chiefs in November 1943, and scheduled for summer of 1944.
While action in New Guinea was underway, and the Marianas campaign was coming to a close, President Roosevelt met with Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur. MacArthur, who suspected that the meeting was more politically motivated than to settle differences in strategy, was surprised that Roosevelt listened carefully to both him and Nimitz. MacArthur voiced his opposition to bypassing the Philippines, arguing that with naval support he could take them back successfully. Nimitz agreed that, assuming progress in the Philippines, either Luzon or Formosa be invaded in February 1945.
MacArthur later recalled that he won FDR's support not just on military arguments, but the general's reminder of America's moral obligation to the Philippines.
With success of MacArthur in New Guinea and Nimitz in the Marianas - the seizure of Saipan, Guam, and Tinian - a decision had to be made: capture the Philippines or bypass them.
Sept. 14, 1944 - the Joint Chiefs directed MacArthur to initially bypass Mindinao, the southernmost island of the Philippines, but seize Leyte. This decision caused Nimitz to reconsider the Formosa invasion. He agreed that MacArthur's plan to seize Luzon after Leyte would effectively neutralize Formosa. He proposed a dual advance along the Luzon-Ryukus (Okinawa) axis, and the Marianas-Bonins axis.
Lt. General Harmon, Commanding General, US Army Air Forces, Pacific, agreed, recommending that CAUSEWAY be abandoned in favor of the Ryukus. Lt. General Simon Buckner, Commanding General of the ground troops designated for CAUSEWAY, also agreed, citing the shortage of support and service troops, making CAUSEWAY unfeasible. General Robert Richardson, Commander, US Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Area, also agreed, as did Fleet Admiral Raymond Spruance.
Admiral Nimitz communicated these views to Admiral King who had been the chief proponent of CAUSEWAY. King, recognizing the War Department's inability to make the resources available before the end of the war in Europe, recommended to the Joint Chiefs that operations against Luzon, the Bonins, and the Ryukus be undertaken successively. CAUSEWAY - invasion of Formosa, would be deferred.
It was thus that MacArthur invaded the main Philippine island, Luzon, in January 1945. The strategic island in the Bonins, Iwo Jima, would be invaded in February 1945. Occupation of Iwo Jima would provide a base for fighter support for bombers operating against Japan from the Marianas.
With invasion of Formosa off the table, the stage was set for invasion of Okinawa. An estimated 780 bombers with fighter escort could be based on Okinawa. Advanced fleet anchorage would be available, intensifying the sea and air blockade against Japan. At long last, after the costly trek across the Pacific, Okinawa, the staging area for invading Kyushu and Honshu, the industrial heart of Japan, was in reach.
The Japanese knew it too, and were well prepared.
To be continued.
- John Waelti's column appears every Friday in the Times. He can be reached at jjwaelti1@tds.net.
Of the countless WWII movies, ranging from the absurd to excellent, few feature the Battle of Okinawa - remarkable, as this was the largest and bloodiest battle of the Pacific War. If few Americans are vaguely aware of the Battle of Okinawa, even fewer are aware of its significance, and still fewer realize that in terms of personnel, ships, planes, and tonnage of supplies, the battle was larger than D-Day. It was, in fact, the largest combined air-land-sea battle in history.
How could this final battle of the war, the largest of all battles, become so lost to America's collective memory? In short, it is because the three-month long battle occurred within the period of March through August 1945 that turned the world upside down and changed it forever. Ironically, the war's end, and the history that the battle helped shape, caused the battle itself to lose its place in history.
To put this all-but-forgotten monumental battle in context, it is instructive to review the strategic considerations and events leading invasion of Okinawa instead of Formosa, as was planned earlier.
The grand objective of the Pacific campaign was to force Japan to unconditional surrender by reaching its industrial heart, concentrated along the southern shore of Honshu. The advance from Pearl Harbor across the Pacific would follow two main axes; one through the South and Southwest Pacific, led by General Douglas MacArthur, and the other through the Central Pacific, led by Admiral Chester Nimitz. As might be expected among strong and forceful commanders, there would be disagreement on strategy.
MacArthur's New Guinea campaign was to defend American and Australian bases from attack and, second, to secure bases from which to support his promised return to the Philippines. Until 1943, the Joint Chiefs could offer only words of encouragement to MacArthur, who was frustrated that the European war had precedence over the Pacific war.
The nation's top sailor, Admiral Ernest King, along with Pentagon planners, had opposed re-taking the Philippines with land forces, recommending only neutralizing it with air and naval bombardment. King's favored route was seizure of Formosa, code named Operation CAUSEWAY, using Formosa as the ultimate route to Japan.
The objective of Admiral Nimitz was to seize the Marianas. In this, he had the support of Admiral King as well as General Arnold, Commander of the Army Air Forces, who saw the Marianas as the launching place for his heavy bombers to strike the heart of Japan
The seizure of the Marshall Islands ahead of schedule in early 1944 by the Central Pacific forces paved the way for invasion of the Marianas. MacArthur opposed Nimitz's Marianas operation, but it had been approved by the Joint Chiefs in November 1943, and scheduled for summer of 1944.
While action in New Guinea was underway, and the Marianas campaign was coming to a close, President Roosevelt met with Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur. MacArthur, who suspected that the meeting was more politically motivated than to settle differences in strategy, was surprised that Roosevelt listened carefully to both him and Nimitz. MacArthur voiced his opposition to bypassing the Philippines, arguing that with naval support he could take them back successfully. Nimitz agreed that, assuming progress in the Philippines, either Luzon or Formosa be invaded in February 1945.
MacArthur later recalled that he won FDR's support not just on military arguments, but the general's reminder of America's moral obligation to the Philippines.
With success of MacArthur in New Guinea and Nimitz in the Marianas - the seizure of Saipan, Guam, and Tinian - a decision had to be made: capture the Philippines or bypass them.
Sept. 14, 1944 - the Joint Chiefs directed MacArthur to initially bypass Mindinao, the southernmost island of the Philippines, but seize Leyte. This decision caused Nimitz to reconsider the Formosa invasion. He agreed that MacArthur's plan to seize Luzon after Leyte would effectively neutralize Formosa. He proposed a dual advance along the Luzon-Ryukus (Okinawa) axis, and the Marianas-Bonins axis.
Lt. General Harmon, Commanding General, US Army Air Forces, Pacific, agreed, recommending that CAUSEWAY be abandoned in favor of the Ryukus. Lt. General Simon Buckner, Commanding General of the ground troops designated for CAUSEWAY, also agreed, citing the shortage of support and service troops, making CAUSEWAY unfeasible. General Robert Richardson, Commander, US Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Area, also agreed, as did Fleet Admiral Raymond Spruance.
Admiral Nimitz communicated these views to Admiral King who had been the chief proponent of CAUSEWAY. King, recognizing the War Department's inability to make the resources available before the end of the war in Europe, recommended to the Joint Chiefs that operations against Luzon, the Bonins, and the Ryukus be undertaken successively. CAUSEWAY - invasion of Formosa, would be deferred.
It was thus that MacArthur invaded the main Philippine island, Luzon, in January 1945. The strategic island in the Bonins, Iwo Jima, would be invaded in February 1945. Occupation of Iwo Jima would provide a base for fighter support for bombers operating against Japan from the Marianas.
With invasion of Formosa off the table, the stage was set for invasion of Okinawa. An estimated 780 bombers with fighter escort could be based on Okinawa. Advanced fleet anchorage would be available, intensifying the sea and air blockade against Japan. At long last, after the costly trek across the Pacific, Okinawa, the staging area for invading Kyushu and Honshu, the industrial heart of Japan, was in reach.
The Japanese knew it too, and were well prepared.
To be continued.
- John Waelti's column appears every Friday in the Times. He can be reached at jjwaelti1@tds.net.