Editors note: This is a the first of a two-part series on the situation in Afghanistan written by Lt. David Wegmueller, brother of Times columnist Dan Wegmueller:
The world is rife with examples of countries unable to curtail narcotics production and trafficking across their borders. Most of these countries have governments more stable than Afghanistan's. Yet, if it is possible to establish a stable government in Afghanistan, a government unsupportive of terrorism, the war on narcotics there must be won. Afghanistan needs to be able to feed itself well enough to make opium production unattractive as an option. To do this, Afghan farmers need the protection and capacity to grow what best supports their country and its neighbors. In order to establish a productive and legitimate agricultural infrastructure in Afghanistan, independent of continual foreign aid, key reforms are necessary. First, land ownership and legal reforms are essential. Second, continued efforts to modernize agricultural practices and establish new agribusiness infrastructure are required. Third, these measures have to be desirable to Afghans.
Coalition forces in Afghanistan are engaged in a costly and controversial struggle there to counter the burgeoning narcotics industry. Nearly eight years after the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, the Taliban is still receiving an enormous income from the trade of illicit narcotics, particularly from opium. Former Clinton Drug Czar, General Barry McCaffrey, retired, believes more than $100 million per year in opium profits reach Taliban hands. According to a New York Times estimate, that amount could be as high as $300 million. In response, the U.S. has spent nearly $45 million a year in an attempt to eradicate poppy fields, efforts which have been called "wasteful" and, "a failure" by Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Despite Coalition efforts, Afghan farmers managed to raise an estimated 8,200 metric tons of opium in 2007, from which 93 percent of the world's heroin was produced. Afghanistan's 2008 crop was only slightly less.
As a result of the continuing boom of Afghan opium production and the failure of poppy field eradication, U.S.-led counter narcotics strategy is changing. Eradication efforts will be marginalized. Studies have shown that poppy legalization would also be counterproductive. Instead, coalition forces will target drug traffickers more intensely. Agricultural alternatives to poppy production, such as wheat, will be encouraged and are already being incentivized, to the tune of $300 million. While U.S. subsidies are crucial because wheat is not currently as lucrative as poppy production, they are not a long-term solution. Incentives will initially coax more wheat cultivation by artificially boosting the price of Afghan wheat, but this alone is not a permanent or fully effective solution because it creates dependency on the U.S. for survival. If this method is continued, the U.S. will be permanently caught in an expensive net, with Afghanistan's agribusiness dependent upon the American dollar for existence. The moment U.S. subsidies are withdrawn, Afghani farmers will revert to growing a crop they are intimately familiar with and which will assuredly pay their bills - opium.
Land ownership is one of the most basic forms of status in Afghan culture, and this will make reforms difficult to implement. Yet, reforms are needed. According to a 2002 estimate, the wealthiest "2.2 percent of the population owned 19 percent of the total land area." Most Afghans are landless, or possess such small parcels of land that it cannot provide for their own needs. The laws governing land ownership are reminiscent of the Old Testament. Often they are local customs and are administered by tribal chiefs and clerics, called "mullahs." Tribal elders hand down verdicts in village meetings. The mullahs hold considerable local power and often exercise authority by "obstructing the efforts of local government officials."
The way ahead for U.S. strategists is to protect and enfranchise the poorest Afghan farmers. Legal reforms are needed to govern how land is leased and owned. Land ownership will be more tenable with the establishment of laws that protect tenants' and small land owners' rights from usury and extortion. These laws would ideally inhibit predatory lending practices and curtail astronomical interest rates. Legal reform should be sensitive to varied cultural and regional nuances, such as nomadism and patrimony. Furthermore, the punishment for defaulted loans should be limited enough in severity that debtors could stand a chance to climb out of their indebtedness.
- Times columnist Dan Wegmueller can be reached at dwegs@tds.net.
The world is rife with examples of countries unable to curtail narcotics production and trafficking across their borders. Most of these countries have governments more stable than Afghanistan's. Yet, if it is possible to establish a stable government in Afghanistan, a government unsupportive of terrorism, the war on narcotics there must be won. Afghanistan needs to be able to feed itself well enough to make opium production unattractive as an option. To do this, Afghan farmers need the protection and capacity to grow what best supports their country and its neighbors. In order to establish a productive and legitimate agricultural infrastructure in Afghanistan, independent of continual foreign aid, key reforms are necessary. First, land ownership and legal reforms are essential. Second, continued efforts to modernize agricultural practices and establish new agribusiness infrastructure are required. Third, these measures have to be desirable to Afghans.
Coalition forces in Afghanistan are engaged in a costly and controversial struggle there to counter the burgeoning narcotics industry. Nearly eight years after the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, the Taliban is still receiving an enormous income from the trade of illicit narcotics, particularly from opium. Former Clinton Drug Czar, General Barry McCaffrey, retired, believes more than $100 million per year in opium profits reach Taliban hands. According to a New York Times estimate, that amount could be as high as $300 million. In response, the U.S. has spent nearly $45 million a year in an attempt to eradicate poppy fields, efforts which have been called "wasteful" and, "a failure" by Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Despite Coalition efforts, Afghan farmers managed to raise an estimated 8,200 metric tons of opium in 2007, from which 93 percent of the world's heroin was produced. Afghanistan's 2008 crop was only slightly less.
As a result of the continuing boom of Afghan opium production and the failure of poppy field eradication, U.S.-led counter narcotics strategy is changing. Eradication efforts will be marginalized. Studies have shown that poppy legalization would also be counterproductive. Instead, coalition forces will target drug traffickers more intensely. Agricultural alternatives to poppy production, such as wheat, will be encouraged and are already being incentivized, to the tune of $300 million. While U.S. subsidies are crucial because wheat is not currently as lucrative as poppy production, they are not a long-term solution. Incentives will initially coax more wheat cultivation by artificially boosting the price of Afghan wheat, but this alone is not a permanent or fully effective solution because it creates dependency on the U.S. for survival. If this method is continued, the U.S. will be permanently caught in an expensive net, with Afghanistan's agribusiness dependent upon the American dollar for existence. The moment U.S. subsidies are withdrawn, Afghani farmers will revert to growing a crop they are intimately familiar with and which will assuredly pay their bills - opium.
Land ownership is one of the most basic forms of status in Afghan culture, and this will make reforms difficult to implement. Yet, reforms are needed. According to a 2002 estimate, the wealthiest "2.2 percent of the population owned 19 percent of the total land area." Most Afghans are landless, or possess such small parcels of land that it cannot provide for their own needs. The laws governing land ownership are reminiscent of the Old Testament. Often they are local customs and are administered by tribal chiefs and clerics, called "mullahs." Tribal elders hand down verdicts in village meetings. The mullahs hold considerable local power and often exercise authority by "obstructing the efforts of local government officials."
The way ahead for U.S. strategists is to protect and enfranchise the poorest Afghan farmers. Legal reforms are needed to govern how land is leased and owned. Land ownership will be more tenable with the establishment of laws that protect tenants' and small land owners' rights from usury and extortion. These laws would ideally inhibit predatory lending practices and curtail astronomical interest rates. Legal reform should be sensitive to varied cultural and regional nuances, such as nomadism and patrimony. Furthermore, the punishment for defaulted loans should be limited enough in severity that debtors could stand a chance to climb out of their indebtedness.
- Times columnist Dan Wegmueller can be reached at dwegs@tds.net.
